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1.- Equity markets display an important function in fostering 
allocative efficiency. Indeed, they appear not only to lower entry barriers 
into the market by providing a wider access to capital (especially important 
for start up technological companies or other emerging firms), thereby 
promoting a more decentralised economy (than the one of bank-centred 
systems) and a more rapid pace of economic growth and innovation2, but 
also to: a) provide a tool for the external control of the “agency costs” 
implied in the shareholders/corporate managers relationship, through the 
exposure of the ownership of the companies to changes driven by the 
market whose associated ordinary effect is thought to be the displacement 
of existing non performing management; and b) prompt, by means of 
market operations directed at fostering the company’s external growth, 
industrial reorganization and consolidation, especially on a wider 
international scale (alongside with the opening of more integrated global 
markets). In so doing securities markets basically allow companies to 
benefit from their major structural advantages in respect to other 
organizational forms which do not admit ownership transmission (as the 
state enterprise) or neutralise the control effects of ownership on 
management (as cooperatives and not-for-profit associations). This proved 
essential to respond to the challenges posed by a market economy 
environment characterised by imperfect competition (and therefore by a 
distinct tendency towards oligopolistic concentration) and was one of the 
reason for the rise and success of the public company model in modern free 
market economy. Takeovers – i.e. the friendly or hostile public offers to 
purchase shares, ordinarily in an amount sufficient to control the company 
– are therefore, in principle, not just a technique for the company’s change 
of control but an instrument of allocative efficiency. To be sure, they are 
not market techniques without substitutes. The disciplinary effect on the 
management exerted by the threat of a takeover can be obtained, indeed, 
also through other market practices like the solicitation of proxies and the 
public offer to purchase votes (instead of shares), if and where, departing 
from the traditional veto of such a practice in the, albeit different, political 
context and from a principle of necessary correlation between risk and 
                                                 
2 J.C.COFFEE JR., J.SELIGMAN, H.A.SALE, Securities Regulation, Cases and Materials, 
Foundation Press, New York, Tenth ed., 2007, p.7 
control, this practice is allowed (3). The industrial consolidation can be 
attained also, albeit with different ownership outcomes, through other 
market transactions like mergers or, in the case of public enterprises, 
through legal intervention. Stocks acquisition is however generally easier 
and more flexible and usually does not depend on anything else than 
market forces alone. This is particularly true for private companies, where 
free bargaining controls and both shareholders, with the articles of 
association, and the bidder, with the offer proposal, can therefore define the 
conditions at which the change of control can take place as they deem fit. 
On the contrary, the way market forces are left to guide the process of 
acquisition in the case of listed public companies varies. 
 
 
 2.- In the U.S. federal legislation on takeovers – enacted with the 
1968 Williams Act and amended in 1970 – refrains from intervening in the 
process other than by imposing to the bidder a few mandatory rules of 
conduct intended to enhance shareholders’ value such as: a) the disclosure 
of a sufficient degree of information (the “early warning” Schedule 13G 
due under § 13d and the Schedule TO, containing the filing disclosure 
statement and its annexed tender offer, under § 14d), so as to avoid, as 
indicated in the House Report, that the shareholders of the target company 
be forced to make a choice on the acceptance or refusal of the offer 
“without the benefit of full disclosure” and without receiving “full and fair 
disclosure analogous to that received in proxy contests”; b) a minimum 
duration of the process (the 20 days set forth by SEC Rule 14e-1), designed 
to provide the shareholders the opportunity “to examine all relevant facts in 
an effort to reach a decision without being subject to unwarranted pressure” 
or “being forced to act hastily”; c) a pro-rata rule, whereby the bidder, even 
if it is left free to fix the amount of shares tendered as it deems fit, without 
any obligation to tender all shares carrying voting rights (as it is on the 
contrary the case of the mandatory tender offer provided for by European 
law), must prorate shares received during the offer under SEC Rule 14d-8 
(which extends during the entire life of the offer a principle with § 14(d)(6) 
would limit to the acceptances received in the first 10 days); d) the non 
discrimination rule, whereby the bidder must offer to all holders (under 
                                                 
3 For a recent comparative study, see Report on the Proportionality Principle in the 
European Union, external study commissioned by the EU Commission to Shearman & 
Sterling, ISS and ECGI, Brussels, July 2007. 
Rule 14d-10) and at the same and best price (§ 14(d)7) the acquisition of 
the targeted amount of shares. The Williams Act, however, does not 
require that the acquisition of control of a listed company comes along with 
a compulsory tender offer (and therefore a moneyed exit solution) to all 
existing shareholders at the same price nor mandates the launch of a 
(subsequent) bid in order to align the economic treatment of dispersed 
shareholders with the one reserved, in an over-the-counter transaction, to 
the former controlling or substantial shareholder(s), if any. In other terms, 
American takeovers are not determined by law but by market forces alone. 
The legal permissibility of partial bids and even of “two tier bids”, in 
which the bidder offers a “front loaded” above market tender offer price 
(and premium) for an amount of shares giving control and announces a 
plan to merge out the remaining minority shareholders at a lower price 
when control is obtained is, in fact, consistent with the policy goal of 
facilitating the (market-driven) takeover process by avoiding an excessive 
cost of the change of control of public listed companies. In turn the policy 
goal of facilitating takeovers is clearly embedded in the underlying 
conceptual premise – dating back to a seminal and highly influential study 
of Manne, but hotly debated since then – that takeovers serve as an external 
and efficient market response to the bad performance of management. It is 
assumed indeed, so the theory goes, that when there are high “agency 
costs”, slack management performance convert into stocks’ under pricing, 
thereby creating a market opportunity for a profitable change of control 
which would bring about the replacement of the slack management4. 
Ironically, though, the Williams Act did not address directly the 
shareholders/managers relationship nor it defines the boundaries of the 
power granted to the incumbent managers to contrast or even frustrate the 
bid, leaving to state law and to the common law of fiduciary duties the task 
to define it.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Some event studies find that companies with more anti-takeover protections had a lower 
Tobin Q throughout the 1990s and showed poorer firm performance in terms of return on 
equity and sales growth (P.GOMPERS, J.ISHII, A.METRICK, Corporate Governance and 
Equity Prices, (2003) 118 Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, as well as managerial 
weakness in minimizing labour costs (M.BERTRAND, S.MULLINATHAN, Executive 
Compensation and Incentives: The Impact of Takeover Legislation, (1998) NBER 
Working Paper 6830).  
3.- The Delaware Supreme Court, in a series of remarkable and 
most cited cases starting from Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum5, 
whilst requiring some justification and proportionality of the board 
defensive decisions “in respect of the threat posed” by the tender offer, 
confirmed (and progressively broadened) the wide authority of the board to 
adopt post bid defensive measures without shareholders’ approval. In 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time6 and even more straightforward 
in Unitrin v. American General Corporation7 - where the Supreme Court 
found legally sufficient the board motivation to adopt a defensive measure 
without seeking the approval of the shareholders since “Unitrin’s 
shareholders might accept American General’s inadequate offer because of 
ignorance or mistaken belief regarding the board’s assessment of the long 
term value of Unitrin’s stock”8 – case law evolved to the point as to 
recognize the board general power, under the common law of fiduciary 
duties, to adopt defensive measures without the need to obtain prior 
shareholders approval with very little in the way of justification9. In 
addition to that, anti-takeover state provisions – upheld by the Supreme 
Court in its landmark decision of 1987 in CTS Corp. v. Dynamic Corp of 
America10 in so far as they impose additional disclosure requirements or 
corporate law restriction but refrain from mandating a prior notice to the 
target company and to state officials some time before the commencement 
of the offer11 - often supplement further the weapons available to the board, 
                                                 
5  493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).  Earlier cases often (but not always) conformed to the plain 
business judgement rule. 
6 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) 
7 651 A.2d 1384 (Del. 1995).  
8 As the Vice Chancellor Strine of Delaware observed, however, “if stockholders are 
presumed competent to buy stock in the first place, why are they not presumed competent 
to decide when to sell in a tender offer after an adequate time for deliberation has been 
afforded them?” (quotation in A.FERREL, Why Continental European Takeover Law 
Matters, in Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe, eds. Ferrarini, Hopt, 
Winter, Wymeersch, Oxford University Press, 2004, at p. 567)  
9 Little more, thus, than a plain “just say no”. This is why J.A.GRUNDFEST, Just vote No: a 
Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 857 
(1993) concluded that “the takeovers wars are over. Management won”. 
10 481 US 69 As correctly pointed out by M.VENTORUZZO, Europe’s Thirteenth Directive 
and U.S. Takeover Regulation: Regulatory Means and Political and Economic Ends, in 41 
Tex. Int’l Law Journal 171 (2006) this decision “denied the existence of an interstate 
market for corporate control protected by the Commerce Clause”. 
11 The Delaware statute requiring a 20 days advance notice to the company and state 
officials was invalidated by the Supreme Court as impermissible burden on the interstate 
commerce and was declared preempted by the federal rules of 1934 Act in Edgar v. Mite 
Corp., 457 US 624 (1982) 
by, for example, a) setting forth that a person acquiring over a certain 
threshold of stocks can vote only with the approval of other shareholders 
(“control share acquisition statutes”); b) prohibiting the combination of the 
target company with the hostile bidder for a period from 2 to 5 years 
(“business combination moratorium statutes”); c) requiring supermajority 
approval for a merger when it fails to satisfy a fair price test (“fair price 
statutes”); d) expressly authorizing the board to take into consideration, 
when assessing the suitability of the offer, also the interests of stakeholders 
other than shareholders (“non shareholders constituencies statutes”). The 
catalogue of defensive measures available to U.S. (mostly Delaware) 
incorporated listed companies is extremely long: though, the most often 
used technique seems to be, still, the combination of a “flip in poison pill” 
and a “classified” or “staggered board”. When a potential bidder crosses a 
stated ownership threshold, the other shareholders are entitled to acquire 
target shares at a bargain price, so that the massive and discriminatory 
(against the bidder) issuance of new and cheap stocks dilutes the bidder 
stake and makes overwhelmingly more expensive the acquisition of the 
control. To be sure, the pill can be made inoffensive if the board – which 
has the power to do so – redeems, instead of triggering, the options. To 
prevent therefore the rational bidder countermove of soliciting proxies to 
appoint, after a successful proxy solicitation, a new board, which will then 
redeem the pill to permit the bid to go forward, the articles of association of 
the companies adopting the pill usually complement it with an additional 
pre-bid technical barrier to the swift change of control consisting in a 
staggered board which makes it impossible to replace the majority of the 
board’s members in a single run, thereby postponing for one or two years 
the effective acquisition of control and, at the same time, exposing the 
bidder to the usually prohibitively risky situation of investing a huge 
amount of money in a transaction which could be closed (with the effective 
taking of power) only after a long period of time12.  
                                                 
12 On this anti-takeover measure, which is reported to have been adopted by around 50 
percent of large US firms J.N.GORDON, An American Perspective on Anti-Takeover Laws 
in the EU: The German Example, in Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe, at 
p. 549; ID.,”Just Say Never? Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills and Shareholder-Adopted By-
Laws: An Essay for Warren Buffet, (1997) 19 Cardozo Law Rev. 511; L.A.BEBCHUK, 
J.C.COATES IV AND G.SUBRAMANIAN, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered 
Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy, (2002) 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887 (where an event study 
of the practical effect of the measure finding that in the period  1996-2000 only 21 firms 
were able to frustrate an hostile bid through this device out of over 40.000 acquisitions in 
the same period: a scarce 0,4%)  
 
 
4.- Contrary to the appearance and to a quite common 
misconception, though, the formal existence of effective anti-takeover 
measures did never convert into a general and functional insulation of U.S. 
listed companies from the market of corporate control. As it has been 
convincingly put forward by Professor Gordon: 
 
“US corporate governance institutions have adapted so that US 
managers rarely resist a premium bid (emphasis added). Acquisition 
activity in the 1990s was, if anything, more intense than in the 1980s, 
measured both as a percent of market capitalization and in the 
number of transactions and much greater if measured in real dollar 
terms or a percent of the GDP. The degree of hostility declined 
across the decades, but we have come to realize that in many cases 
hostility is merely an artifact of when a deal becomes public. Many 
transactions that start off as unwelcome overtures end up as 
“friendly” rather than “hostile” if target management decides that 
resistance is unsustainable and undesirable. There are very few 
financial buyers pursuing highly leveraged hostile burst up, but this 
is more because of the dearth of target for which this 1980s deal 
strategy now makes economic sense. During the 1990s the hostile 
bidders were strategic buyers, including some of the most widely 
respected firms, with access to internally generated capital. This shift 
in the nature of the buyers helps to explain why the minuet of 
resistance and capitulation often played out privately. Nevertheless 
the threat of going hostile is still very important because many 
friendly deals are negotiated against the backdrop of the hostile bid 
possibility”. 
 
In a quantitative perspective – looking thus at the overall numbers of 
takeover transactions without distinguishing qualitatively in respect to the 
bigger or lesser sensitivity of certain industries or companies to the 
pressure for the isolation from the market for corporate control – it has 
been possible, therefore, to argue13 that “defensive measures do not really 
protect US firms from hostile bid. Generally speaking, they merely 
structure a process in which the target board can negotiate an higher price 
                                                 
13 J.N.GORDON, An American Perspective on Anti-Takeover Laws, p.  548. 
for the shareholders (emphasis added). But that fortunate outcome is the 
result of institutions and practices that may not be easy to reproduce 
elsewhere. Thus the same basic legal rules may lead to radically different 
outcome” in other legal systems. In fact, “the set of mitigatory institutions 
or adaptive institutions“ which in practice often render the high powered 
defensive measures available unable to systematically impede the takeover 
market includes, i.a.: a) First, the fact that the flip in poison pills is 
reversible and value enhancing for the existing shareholders, except for the 
discriminated bidder, and for the company and is not a self-destructive and 
irreversible measure which reduce the value of the firm in order to “save it” 
as it happened with many of the “old” measures used in the U.S. in the 
1970s and early 1980s (selling off the crown jewels, i.e. assets that the 
bidder might prize; entering into “tin parachute” agreements with 
management and file employees that promise large bonus conditional upon 
the change of control; respond with “pac-man” strategy of counter-bidding 
for the offeror; reshaping the capital structure through additional 
leverage)14; b) Second, the “typical U.S. practice of annual shareholders 
elections of board members combined with heavy institutional investor 
ownership in large public firms means that managers and directors are 
highly sensitive to public shareholder interest in considering the bid; c) 
Third, the use of stock options and other executive compensation devices 
which align managerial and shareholder interest in the takeover decision15. 
Not surprisingly, thus, during the Nineties, European companies bought 
American companies at a far greater rate (almost three times, when 
calculated in aggregated value) than American companies bought 
European ones16  
 
 
5.- Qualitatively, however, it remains somehow unclear how the 
anti-takeover philosophy embedded in the state corporate laws and in the 
current judicial construction of the board’s fiduciary duties is exerting, 
under the pressure of local politics, a role in insulating from the market of 
corporate control specific relevant companies incorporated in the U.S., 
displaying a central role within the American economy: a question which 
appears especially relevant in a transatlantic cross-border perspective17. In 
                                                 
14 J.N.GORDON, An American Perspective on Anti-Takeover Laws, p.  551. 
15 J.N.GORDON, An American Perspective on Anti-Takeover Laws, p.  553. 
16 G.SUBRAMANIAN, The Influence of Anti-Takeover Statutes on Incorporation 
Choice:Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Anti-Takeover-Reaching, in 150 U.Pa. L. 
Rev. 1795 (2002), at p. 1867-68. 
17 The cross-border perspective poses, obviously, also several questions concerning the 
concurrent applicability of different, and sometimes inconsistent, national rules to the 
same tender offer: for an example, see SEC Release no. 7759 of October 22, 1999 and no. 
7760 of November 10, 1999 providing a two tier exemptive structure for the bids 
other terms, if we look at the control of “Corporate America”, it remains to 
be investigated to what extent strategic U.S. public listed companies are 
contestable by foreign bidders – to be true, not only European companies 
but possibly, today, even Russian or Indian or Chinese private or state-
funded investment vehicles – and to what extent international law can 
provide a level playing field for U.S. and non-U.S. investors. In fact, a few 
relevant restrictions to foreign takeovers exist, despite the multilateral 
international provisions of GATS aimed at liberalizing market access and 
foreign investment18. In particular, the “Exon-Florio” provision19 entitles 
the President to suspend or prohibit any foreign acquisition, merger or 
takeover of a U.S. firm that is found to threaten the national security. The 
proviso is implemented by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States (CFIUS), an inter-agency committee chaired by the Secretary 
of Treasury in charge of reviewing proposed transactions, usually upon a 
voluntary prior notice. The confidential nature of the CFIUS review 
process makes it difficult to account for the cases. According to one source, 
however, CFIUS conducted so far full investigation of 25 cases. To our 
knowledge, of these 25 cases, thirteen transactions were withdrawn upon 
notice that CFIUS would conduct a full review and twelve of the remaining 
transactions were sent to the President with a single order prohibiting the 
acquisition in 1990 of Mamco Manufacturing Company (an aerospace parts 
manufacturer) by the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export 
Corporation (CATIC), owned by the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China20. Since 11 September 2001, it is reported that the CFIUS review 
process has intensified due to sensitive national security concerns. In the 
Telecommunication sector, in turn, Section 310 of the Communications 
Act of 1934, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, imposes 
foreign ownership restrictions on U.S. broadcast, common carrier, or 
aeronautical radio station licensees. Finally, Section 1117 of the Federal 
Aviation Act requires in general that transportation funded by the U.S. 
government be performed by U.S. carriers while the Merchant Marine Act 
of 1920 (“Jones Act”) prohibits foreign-built vessels from engaging in 
coastal trade, dredging, towing or salvaging.  
 
 
                                                                                                                          
concerning securities of a foreign issuer partly held by U.S. investors. For a brief 
overview, J.C.COFFEE JR., J.SELIGMAN, H.A.SALE, Securities Regulation, p. 840. 
18 See European Commission, U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2006., 
February 2007, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/february/tradoc_133290.pdf 
19 Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 as amended by Section 5021 of the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 and by  Section 837(a) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, called the "Byrd Amendment,". 
20 See CRS Report for Congress, at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33312.pdf 
 6.- In Europe, the regulatory experience on takeover bids draws 
extensively from the original English model. In the United Kingdom, in 
fact, hostile takeovers became a quite common market practice in the 
1950s21, also thanks to the financial ability of bankers like Sigmund 
Warburg and Charles Clore. The first regulation was thus to be found in the 
Notes of Amalgamations of British Business of 1959 and, nine years later, 
in the first edition of the self-regulatory Code on Takeovers and Mergers of 
1968: a remarkable collection of “soft” rules, enforced by the private Panel 
on Takeovers and Mergers, which set and anticipated most of the basic 
principles which are today embedded in the European harmonized 
legislation. The City Code dictated indeed specific provisions: a) on the 
procedure, designed first to prevent the bidder from coercing the targeted 
shareholders into an hasty decision on whether to accept or not the offer 
and, second, to favour the smooth performance of the transaction and 
shareholders’ price maximisation, by consenting both price increase by the 
bidder and competing offers, if any; b) on the information to be provided 
during the process by the bidder and by the board of directors, so as to put 
the shareholders in an unbiased position for adopting a conscious decision 
on the acceptance or refusal of the offer; c) on minority protection, 
bringing about the obligation to launch a bid at comparable conditions 
when the acquisition over-the-counter of a controlling stake triggered a 
change of control (so called “mandatory offer”); d) on the neutrality of the 
board, which, under General Principle 7, was from the outset barred, once a 
bona fide offer had been made or had been announced as imminent, from 
taking any action which could “frustrate the bid” without the prior 
shareholders’ approval. The contestability of the corporate control did 
represent, thus, one of the takeover policy goals from the very outset of the 
first European model of takeovers (self)regulation. This was not related 
solely to post-bid defences. The English law, in fact, addressed also, albeit 
partially, the issue of pre-bid anti-takeover measures. As it has been 
correctly pointed out22:  
 
                                                 
21 Prior to World War II it is reported that takeovers were essentially “friendly”, consisting 
in the negotiated acquisition of the directors’ personal stake followed by an offer of the 
buyer to all shareholders to sell also their shares at identical conditions accompanied by a 
recommendation of the board to accept the offer: A.FERREL, Why Continental European 
Takeover Law Matters, p. 569 (where additional references). 
22 A.FERREL, Why Continental European Takeover Law Matters, p. 570 
“There are a number of relevant statutory and London Stock 
Exchange rules that impede the adoption of certain types of defensive 
tactics. In addition to these provisions, there is a common law 
doctrine that managers may only use their corporate powers for 
“proper purposes”. In the groundbreaking case of Hogg v. 
Cramphorn it was concluded  that placing a large block of stock in a 
trust fund established for the benefit of corporate employees was 
found to constitute an improper purpose of English common law 
given that the purpose of the managers in placing the shares was to 
block potential bidders”. 
 
 
7.- Building on this model and at the end of a long and extremely 
disputed legislative history (reflecting both the very different starting point 
of national corporate laws regulating pre-bid and post-bid defences and, 
more broadly, the non converging political and historical approaches of 
national industries to the contest for corporate control prior to 
harmonization), the European Union recently reached, with directive 
2004/25/EC an harmonized platform grounded on these principles. As a 
matter of fact23, according to the Financial Services Action Plan adopted by 
the Commission in 1999 and to the position expressed by the European 
Council in Lisbon, the enactment of a framework directive on takeover 
bids was expected as an important component of the EC capital market 
regulation, precisely designed to set a common European framework for 
cross-border takeover bids, whereby contributing to the reorganisation of 
European companies and to the development of a single pan-European 
capital market. In the White Paper on the completion of the internal market 
published in 1985 the Commission first expressed its intention to draft a 
directive to harmonise Member States provisions on take over bids. In 
1989 the Commission was finally able to publish a detailed first proposal 
but, since the European Council considered it overly detailed and the 
proposal encountered the opposition of many Member States, the 
                                                 
23 Compare B.DAUNER LIEB, M.LAMANDINI, Report to the European Parliament on the 
Commission’s new proposal of a directive on company law concerning takeover bids, with 
particular reference to the recommendations of the High Level Group of Company Law 
Experts set up by the European Commission and to the achievement of a level playing 
field in the domain of takeover bids, (Study no. IV/2002/06/01), Official Expert Report 
delivered to the European Parliament on 9 December 2002 in the stage of parliamentary 
discussion of the directive proposal which was then to become directive 2004/25/EC. 
Commission preferred to drop it and to publish a revised version in 1996 in 
the form of a framework directive which set out general principles but at 
the same time left wider scope to the legislation of Member States. The 
proposal was recommended by the Economic and Social Committee and by 
the European Parliament, which proposed however 20 amendments. In 
1997 the Commission published therefore a new version which took 
account of the recommendations of the European Parliament. In 2000 a 
common position was achieved in the European Council. On second 
reading, however, the discussion in the Parliament revealed major 
differences between the European Parliament and the European Council. In 
particular, the European Parliament posed the question of the regulation of 
a squeeze out and sell out right which was not covered by the proposal and 
required a more detailed definition of the “equitable price” paid in the 
event of a mandatory bid. Furthermore the Parliament stressed the 
importance of adding provisions for the protection of employees affected 
by a takeover bid. The following conciliation procedure ended up with a 
compromised text which, surprisingly (but not without merit), failed to 
obtain the required majority for enactment in the plenary session of the 
European Parliament on 4 July 2001 (when, for the first time in the 
Parliamentary history, 273 members voted in favour and 273 members 
voted against the conciliation text). The Parliament, following the German 
position, still considered that: a) a principle whereby the board of the target 
company could not take defensive measures in the face of a bid without the 
prior approval of the shareholders’ meeting to be held once the bid has 
been launched, could not be accepted until such time as a level playing 
field was created for European companies facing a takeover bid; b) the 
protection afforded by the directive proposal to the employees was still 
insufficient; c) the proposal failed also to achieve a level playing field with 
the United States. Following such a vote of the European Parliament, the 
Commission set up a High Level Group of Company Law Experts with the 
mandate to examine the issues raised by the Parliament in relation to the ill 
fated directive proposal. The High Level Group rendered its advice with an 
influential – albeit hotly debated - Report delivered on 10 January 2002. 
On 2 October 2002 the Commission submitted a new directive proposal, 
which, on one hand, confirmed many of the provisions of the 2001 ill-fated 
directive proposal but, on the other hand, also endeavoured to properly 
address the issues raised by the European Parliament in July 2001. The 
parliamentary position – reflected by the report of MP Klaus H. Lehne, 
rapporteur at the EP Legal Affairs and Internal Market Committee24 – was 
favourable in principle, although it was required that the “break through” 
rule of pre-bid defensive measures set out in Article 11 of the 
Commission’s proposal (designed, along the lines of the suggestions of the 
High Level Group, to address the issue of the level playing field throughout 
the Union), be amended in order to encompass several additional pre-bid 
defences, and primarily multiple voting25 still uncovered by the proposal. 
Faced with the fierce opposition of some Member States to adopt a 
directive with such a broadened break through provision, in May 2003 the 
Portuguese Presidency tabled a compromise proposal (then incorporated in 
a new draft of the directive proposal presented in June 2003), rendering 
optional the provisions of article 9 and 11 on anti-takeover defences. This 
proposal reached in fall 2003 the political compromise between the 
Parliament and the Council (with the opposition, though, of the 
Commission) and led to the final approval of the directive26.  
 
 
8.- Directive 2004/25/EC “lays down measures coordinating the 
laws, regulations, administrative provisions, codes of practices and other 
arrangements of the Member States, including arrangements established by 
organisations officially authorised to regulate the markets, relating to 
takeover bids for the securities of companies governed by the laws of 
Member States, where all or some of those securities are admitted to 
trading on a regulated market in one or more Member States”. Member 
States can however extend, if deemed appropriate, the applicability of its 
provisions also to non listed securities when implementing the directive 
and, under Article 3(2)(a) “lay down additional conditions and provisions 
more stringent than those of the directive for the regulation of the bids” or, 
under Article 4(5)(i), “include such derogations in their national rules” 
which, without derogating to the general principles of the directive 
(referred to here below), be necessary “in order to take into account of 
circumstances determined at national level”. The directive sets out in 
Article 3, a series of general principles which must be complied with in the 
                                                 
24 COM(2002)534 – C5-0481/2002-2000/0240(COD), 11 March 2003 
25 For a brief  account, P.O.MULBERT, Make it or Break it: The Break-Through Rule as a 
Break-Through for the European Takeover Directive?, in Reforming Company and 
Takeover Law in Europe, p. 713. 
26 On the last phase of this complex legislative process, M.BECHT, Reciprocity in 
Takeovers, in Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe, p. 650 
implementation of the directive and namely that: a) “all holders of the 
securities of an offeree company of the same class must be afforded 
equivalent treatment; moreover if a person acquires control of a company, 
the other holders of securities must be protected”; b) “all holders of the 
securities of an offeree company must have sufficient time and information 
to enable them to reach a properly informed decision on the bid; where it 
advises the holders of securities, the board of the offeree company must 
give its views on the effects of implementation of the bid on employment, 
conditions of employment and the locations of the company’s places of 
business”; c) “the board of an offeree company must act in the interest of 
the company as a whole and must not deny the holders of the securities the 
opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid”; d) “false markets must not 
be created in the securities of the offeree company, of the offeror company 
or of any other company concerned by the bid”; e) “an offeror must 
announce a bid only after ensuring that he/she can fulfill in full any cash 
consideration, if such is offered, and after taking all reasonable measures to 
secure the implementation of any other type of consideration”; f) “the 
offeree company must not be hindered in the conduct of its affairs for 
longer than it is reasonable by a bid for its securities”.  
 
 
9.- According to said general principles, the directive covers a wide 
range of issues.  
a) It dictates, under Article 4, a principle for the allocation of the 
supervisory functions in respect to cross-border takeovers which, on one 
hand, where the target company has its registered office in a Member State 
other than the one of listing and trading, gives some leave way to European 
regulatory and supervisory arbitrage and, on the other hand, differentiate 
between matters relating to “market rules” or “securities law provisions” 
(those on the consideration to be offered,  the bid procedure and the 
information to be provided) – which are governed by the “rules of the 
Member State of the competent authority” and matters “relating to the 
information to be provided to employees of the offeree company and in 
matters relating to company law” – herein included, however, “the 
conditions under which the board of the offeree company may undertake 
any action which might result in the frustration of the bid” – governed by 
the laws of the Member State in which the offeree company has its 
registered office27. 
b) It sets out in Article 5, for the protection of the minority 
shareholders, a mandatory bid at equitable price, it being the highest price 
offered by the bidder during the last six to twelve months before the bid. 
c) It details, under Article 6, the basic information to be provided for 
by the bidder in the offer document (a provision supplemented by 
additional disclosure duties under Article 8, in order to “prevent the 
publication or dissemination of false information”). 
d) It defines, in Article 7, the duration of the offer from a minimum 
of two weeks to a maximum of 10 weeks (Member States are however 
allowed to extend it “on condition that the offeror gives at least two weeks’ 
notice of his/her intention of closing the bid” or “in order to allow the 
offeree company to call a general meeting of shareholders to consider the 
bid”). 
e) It posits in Article 9 a “non frustration rule”, whereby the “board 
of the offeree company (such being, in a two-tier board system, “both the 
management and the supervisory board”: Article 9-6) shall obtain the prior 
authorisation of the general meeting of shareholders given for this purpose 
before taking any action, other than seeking alternative bids, which may 
result in the frustration of the bid and in particular before issuing any 
shares which may result in a lasting impediment to the offeror’s acquiring 
control of the offeree company”. The constraints on the board’s discretion 
operate “from the time the board receives the information” referred to in 
Article 6 (unless Member States anticipate it at an earlier state, “for 
example as soon as the board of the offeree company becomes aware that 
the bid is imminent”) “and until the result of the bid is made public or the 
bid lapses” and extends to all decisions, even if already taken but not yet 
partly or fully implemented, “which does not form part of the normal 
course of the company’s business and the implementation of which may 
result in the frustration of the bid”. 
f) It requires, again in Article 9, that the board “draw up and publish 
a document setting out its opinion of the bid and the reasons on which it is 
based”. Having clear the potential re-allocative effects often brought about 
by a takeover (relocation and economy of scale effects when the takeover 
                                                 
27 For a discussion of this relevant provision, see M.BENEDETTELLI, Offerte pubbliche di 
acquisto e concorrenza tra ordinamenti nel sistema comunitario, working paper (on file 
with the Author), forthcoming in Banca, borsa e tit. cred., 2007, I. 
is industrially motivated; “burst up” effects, when the takeover is 
financially motivated), the directive mandates to the board to expressly 
include in such a document “its views on the effects of implementation of 
the bid on all the company’s interests and specifically employment, and on 
the offeror’s strategic plans for the offeree company and their likely 
repercussions on employment and on the locations of the company’s places 
of business”. Particular emphasis is given to the employees perspective, by 
making the same addressee of the document in addition to the shareholders 
and by providing that “when the board of the offeree company receives in 
good time a separate opinion from the representatives of its employees on 
the effects of the bid on employment, the opinion shall  be appended to the 
document”. 
g) It sets out, under Article 10, a new, specific transparency 
provision concerning pre-bid defensive measures28, consisting of a duty to 
publish information and present an explanatory report to the annual general 
meeting concerning the structures and measures that could hinder the 
acquisition and exercise of control over the company, such as “the structure 
of the capital”, “any restriction on the transfer of securities”, “significant 
direct and indirect shareholdings (including indirect shareholdings through 
pyramid structures and cross-shareholdings)”, “the holders of any securities 
with special control rights and a description of those rights”, “any 
restrictions on voting rights”, “any agreement between the shareholders 
which may result in restriction on the transfer of securities and/or voting 
rights”, “the rules governing the appointment and replacement of the board 
members”, “the powers of board members and in particular the power to 
issue or buy back shares”, “any significant agreement to which the 
company is a party and which take effect, alter or terminate upon a change 
of control of the company following a takeover bid, and the effects 
thereof”, as well as “golden parachutes” between the “company and its 
board members or employees providing for compensation if they resign or 
are made redundant without valid reasons or if their employment ceases 
because of a takeover bid”. 
                                                 
28 This obligation clearly relies on an efficient market hypothesis and therefore on the 
assumption that the market shall evaluate these structures, better pricing the shares of the 
companies whose ownership structure is open and contestable. This provision mandates 
disclosure but not displacement of pre bid technical barriers. Due to market imperfections, 
it seems hard to believe that transparency alone could bring about the necessary level 
playing field, at least at the present degree of development of securities markets in Europe.  
h) It provides, under Article 11, a break through rule aimed at 
making unenforceable during the bid and at dismantling, if the bid is 
successful, at least some of the most common pre bid defensive measures 
that can be regarded as hindering bids such as “any restrictions on the 
transfer of securities or on voting rights (herein included multiple vote) 
provided for in the articles of association or in contractual agreements” and 
“extraordinary rights of shareholders concerning the appointment or 
removal board members”. 
i) It provides, under Article 13, a referral to Member State legislation 
on the rules concerning, i.a., “the revision of bids”, “competing bids”, “the 
irrevocability of bids and conditions permitted”;  
l) It safeguards in Article 14 the information and consultation 
procedures  with the representatives of the employees, especially relevant 
where co-determination is nationally recognized;  
m) It introduces, under Article 15, the squeeze out procedure 
requested by the European Parliament which enables a shareholder who 
holds not less than 90% of voting securities following a takeover bid to 
require the remaining minority shareholders to sell her or him their 
securities at a fair price;  
n) It introduces, under Article 16, a sell out right for the benefit of 
the minority shareholders upon the same terms and conditions provided for 
in the squeeze out procedure;  
o) It incorporates, under Article 18, a new provision on committee 
procedure which somehow extends to the domain of company law the 
Lamfalussy procedures set out for financial markets and which therefore 
raised some political concerns within the parliamentary circles (concerns 
then addressed by the sunset provision of Article 18(3), whereby “four 
years after the entry into force of the directive, the application of those of 
its provisions that require the adoption of technical rules and decisions 
according to the comitology procedure shall be suspended” and shall be 
reviewed by Parliament and Council). 
p) It sets forth in Article 19 a contact committee “to facilitate the 
harmonised application of the directive through regular meetings dealing 
with practical problems arising in connection with its application” (it being 
however specified that “it shall not be the function of the contact 
committee to appraise the merits of decisions taken by the supervisory 
authorities in individual cases”) and “to advise the Commission, if 
necessary, on additions and amendments to the directive”. 
q) Finally, it provides, under Article 20, a revision clause aimed at 
achieving, at a later stage, a more level playing field in takeover bids.  
 
 
10.- It is apparent from the foregoing that the “most innovative 
core” of the directive relies on the provisions concerning the contestability 
of control. Indeed, most of the harmonized rules on disclosure and 
procedure – as well as the one on mandatory bids – essentially ratify a 
convergence, inspired by the original U.K. model, which, at the date of 
enactment of the directive, had already taken place in (at least) the 
principal Member States. Not surprisingly, these well settled provisions 
received quite general acceptance, despite the inevitable existence of inside 
inconsistencies, as a result of the multiplicity of policy goals traditionally 
pursued by the takeover (British-style) regulation, for example between the 
provision of a mandatory bid at the “highest price” and the (coexistent) 
purpose of fostering the market for corporate control29. Despite the fact that 
the innovative conceptual core of the directive relies in the provisions of 
articles 9-11 aimed, in their true substance, at fostering the contestability of 
control of European listed companies, it would be wrong to read such a 
directive as the final recognition of a general European ban of national, 
public or private, defensive measures capable of insulating the ownership 
of listed companies from the market for corporate control. On one hand, 
indeed, the harmonizing rules directed at setting a level playing field in 
respect to private-law pre-bid and post-bid defences are made only optional 
by Article 12. They do represent, thus, a European benchmark for 
policymakers, but not yet a compulsory rule mandated throughout Europe. 
In practice, thus, as the directive’s legislative history and its subsequent 
national implementation show, the “sunlight” on national regulatory 
choices brought about by the political debate accompanying the directive 
proposal served to highlight the existing uneven openness to the contest for 
corporate control of national champions and the political inability to reach 
a European convergence on the level playing field. This, ironically, 
prompted - instead of the removal of existing barriers - a nationalistic 
                                                 
29 Such a price, in fact, whereas it affords the best protection to the minority shareholders, 
might render the launch of a bid, in certain circumstances, overly costly (especially when 
prices are decreasing), thereby impairing the contestability of control. For a critical re-
assessment of the mandatory bid, in general, L.ENRIQUES, The Mandatory Bid Rule in the 
Proposed EC Takeover Directive: Harmonization or Rent –Seeking?, in Reforming 
Company and Takeover Law in Europe, p. 767-795. 
insurgence of new ones (at least in the short term). On the other hand, 
public-law restrictions to the contestability of control fall outside the scope 
of the directive and are covered straight by the Treaty, as interpreted by a 
rising flow of path-breaking ECJ decisions. Both issues deserve closer 
scrutiny.  
 
 
11.- As regards private-law pre-bid and post-bid defences, it seems 
correct to state that, from the outset, the implied political foundation of a 
takeover directive was indeed to be found in the need to create a level 
playing field within the European internal market which could facilitate 
and accelerate the European integration process and could make it as easy 
for a British or Italian company, for example, to acquire, through a 
successful takeover bid, a French or German company as it would have 
been for a French or German company to acquire the controlling interest in 
a British or Italian company. In other words, takeover bids had to be 
possible freely within the European internal market. The underlying 
rationale for that was twofold. On one hand, it was necessary to duly 
implement Article 43 of the Treaty which sets out the principle of freedom 
of establishment. Such principle refers indeed not only to the incorporation 
but also to the management of companies. Accordingly, Article 44 g) – 
which constitutes the legal basis of the directive – requires the Community 
to issue directives under the co-determination procedure set out under 
Article 251 to coordinate certain safeguards which, for the protection of the 
interests of members and others, Member States require of companies 
governed by the law of a Member State with a view to making such 
safeguards equivalent throughout the Community. This means - as the 
directive itself acknowledges in the recitals – that a Community action is 
needed to “prevent patterns of corporate restructuring within the 
Community” (namely the consolidation of the European industry, also 
through cross border take over bids) “from being distorted by arbitrary 
differences in governance and management culture”. Since the freedom of 
establishment is also to be recognised in the acquisition of the control of a 
company established in a different Member State, it could be effectively 
implemented only through the introduction of a level playing field 
throughout Europe concerning takeover bids. On the other hand, if we 
assume (as it is the case of the current European approach, in response to a 
trend toward oligopolistic consolidation which characterizes since long the 
global markets) that, as a matter of policy, takeovers are to be generally30 
“presumed” economically beneficial for the shareholders and the overall 
economy, both as an instrument of industrial consolidation and, especially 
where the ownership is widely dispersed among shareholders, of external 
monitoring and displacement of slack management, they should be 
regulated in order to favour the contestability of control and, by doing so, 
to foster the on going process of trans-national growth of the European 
companies to an optimal scale in order to duly protect – as it is required by 
Article 44 g) of the Treaty – the interests of members. To this purpose, the 
right to take decisions which might hinder the success of the bid and thus 
the change of control should be vested into the shareholders of the target 
company and not into the management of the same. Managers could easily 
act, in this respect, in conflict of interest. In other terms contestability of 
control requires shareholders’ empowerment as a reaction to any possible 
form of managerial entrenchment (31). This is to say that the major 
justification for a European action towards the harmonised removal of pre-
bid and post-bid barriers to takeover rests at the interplay of internal 
market integration (herein included an integrated and well protected 
financial market) and the correlated, perceived, need to favour, with the 
takeovers regulation, as much as possible the emergence and growth of 
trans-European and even pan-European listed company as an engine of the 
development and restructuring of the European industry in the context of 
an international global economy32.  
                                                 
30 This is not to say, thus, that in some (or even many) cases takeovers may adversely 
affect shareholders, suppliers, employees and the overall economy. To be true, even the 
idea itself underlying the directive, namely that takeovers are desirable from an overall 
economic point of view and that European legislation should facilitate takeovers, could 
politically be disputed in its very foundation. But since the directive is clearly (and 
probably realistically) based on this idea, grounded in turn in the actual features of real, 
global markets, it is certainly outside the scope of this work to address the question of its 
political merit. 
31 This is not to say that a parallel shareholders’ empowerment is recognised on the part of 
the bidder. And this is so despite – as it is commonly recognized and also the High Level 
Group noted  –  takeover bids are not always beneficial for the bidder and its shareholders. 
Bids may sometimes be wealth destroying for the bidder’s shareholders. This is a matter 
of the corporate governance of the bidder which – following the advice rendered by the 
High Level Group –  has been considered outside the scope of the directive. A similar 
approach was sponsored by the British Company Law Review Steering Group which, in 
its final report, did not find a clear case for the introduction of such a rule, although it 
recommended  to keep the issue under review.  
32 Clearly, board neutrality has very different implications in systems with concentrated 
ownership structures, where the controlling shareholder(s) not only would normally 
 
 
12.- Initially, both the Commission and the Council denied the 
absence of a level playing field, arguing that the different anti takeover 
measures existing in the economic and legal systems in each Member State 
neutralised each other. Consequently, all companies within the European 
Union were said to have substantially the same possibilities of defending 
themselves against hostile takeover bids regardless of the Member State in 
which they were incorporated. This position soon proved flawed, when it 
resulted that anti-takeover technical barriers embedded in national 
corporate laws do not exist identically in all Member States. Whereas, for 
example, multiple voting shares had been abolished in Italy, Austria, Spain, 
and Germany, they were still common in France, Sweden and in the other 
Scandinavian countries. Pyramids on the other hand were much more 
common in continental Europe than in Northern Europe. Voting caps in 
turn were admissible for instance in Austria, the Netherlands, France, 
Spain, and Italy (prior to the company law reform of 2003) whereas they 
were forbidden in Belgium and Germany. Non-voting shares and voting 
rights agreements were admissible and common almost everywhere in 
Europe but shareholders’ agreements were perhaps more common in 
Continental Europe than in the United Kingdom. Although no 
comprehensive study had yet been made to review all these different anti 
takeover pre bid techniques in all different Member States33, it emerged 
quite soon that, although each Member State offered one or more technical 
pre bid defences, companies incorporated in some Member States had a far 
greater range of possibilities to use provisions of their articles of 
association or other legal means to protect themselves against hostile 
takeovers than companies incorporated in other Member States. Despite 
these findings, as anticipated, none of the previous directives had ever set 
out provisions specifically aimed at dismantling the pre bid technical 
barriers erected or allowed by national company laws of the different 
Member States to discourage takeover bids. And it was so, although the 
Commission was aware of the problem at least since 1990, in the wake of 
                                                                                                                          
appoint the majority of the board but also approve virtually all defensive measures: 
M.VENTORUZZO, Europe’s Thirteenth Directive and U.S. Takeover Regulation, at p. 214. 
33 See now Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union, external study 
commissioned by the EU Commission to Shearman & Sterling, ISS and ECGI, Brussels, 
July 2007. 
the publication of the Booz Allen report (34) and of the Coopers & Lybrand 
study (35), which devoted great attention to this specific issue. Actually, the 
Commission initially reacted to those reports putting forward a 
comprehensive set of amendments’ proposals to the Second directive on 
company law, to the takeover directive proposal (this latter however solely 
in order to limit the use of  resolutions authorising the board to buy back 
own shares passed prior to the bid) and particularly to the draft Fifth 
directive on company law which have become known as the “Bangemann 
Proposals”. Unfortunately, with the sole exception of the amendments to 
the Second directive (approved by the Council in 1985), these proposals 
were unsuccessful, as the Fifth directive proposals remained blocked.  
 
 
13.- Later, with the ill fated 2001 takeover proposal the Commission 
preferred to focus only on the post bid technical barriers, hereby adopting 
the “passivity rule” set out now in Article 9 of the directive, and to set 
aside the question of the harmonisation of the great many company law 
features which could, and in fact (with different patterns in all Member 
States) did and do, function as pre-bid technical barriers to takeovers. As 
scholars correctly noted, this restrictive approach to the level playing field 
question somehow insisted, theoretically, on a slippery distinction between 
core company law and securities law. In other words, it was adopted on the 
implied assumption that tackling pre bid measures would have entailed the 
introduction of major changes in European company law and would have 
been outside the scope of the take over directive, perceived as a securities’ 
piece of legislation. It was argued on the contrary that if the rationale of the 
neutrality rule set out in Article 9 of the directive proposal was and is to be 
found in the facilitation of the contest for the corporate control, the 
difference between pre bid and post bid measures necessarily blurs. 
Focusing only on post bid technical barriers would leave in fact companies 
free to adopt pre bid governance devices that effectively block a hostile 
takeover from ever being made and thereby insulate them from the market 
                                                 
34 BOOZ ALLEN ACQUISITION SERVICES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, Study on Obstacles to 
Takeover Bids in the European Community, Brussels, December 1989, passim. 
35 Barriers to Takeovers in the European Community, Report commissioned by the British 
Department of Trade and Industry, 1989, passim. 
for corporate control. It has been correctly added to it (36) that the pre offer 
barriers – which are part of the formal structure of the corporate 
governance environment – do also facilitate the erection of structural 
barriers, which by contrast reflect the effect of existing conditions in the 
economic environment, and include such circumstances as concentration of 
ownership in families, the influence of large universal banks and the 
reliance on debt as opposed to equity financing. Technical pre bid barriers 
therefore serve under several respect to insulate pre-existing outcomes in 
the economic environment when change would otherwise shift the efficient 
boundary of the firm. Furthermore, takeover regulation in Europe is not 
only a component of securities regulation but also (and perhaps even more 
so) an important creature of company law and corporate governance. The 
provisions on transparency and disclosure in the takeover process are 
certainly crucial in so much as they play a major role in redressing market 
imperfections providing the investors with a sufficient flow of information, 
but at the same time it cannot be neglected that a very significant focus of 
takeover regulation rests on the protection of minority shareholders in the 
change of control and in their fair treatment. This is why, although this 
regulation is clearly at the interstices of company and securities law and 
covers both aspects, the directive is a piece of legislation expressly 
classified as on company law and it has its legal basis in the second 
paragraph of Article 44 g) of the Treaty. It was and would be therefore hard 
to accept that corporate matters should remain outside the scope of the 
same insofar as they affect the takeover activity, rendering the launch of an 
unfriendly takeover virtually impossible (37). Finally, it would seem that, 
despite the different attitude shown by the Bangemann proposal some years 
ago, there would be little merit indeed in providing company law rules 
directed to enhance the contestability of corporate control of listed 
companies with the Fifth (or any other) directive on company law devoted 
to all joint stock companies irrespective of the listing of their shares. Doing 
so, the legislation would mistakenly equate and force into a single statutory 
                                                 
36 R.GILSON, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European 
Corporate Governance Environment, in European Takeovers Law and Practice, eds. Hopt 
and Wymeersch, Butterworths, London, 1992, and in 61 Fordham Law Review 161 (1992) 
37  In the British experience, the intersection between company law and securities law was 
already very clearly stated by  the  Jenkins Committee which found in its 1962 Report that 
“company law should avoid, as far as possible, placing obstacles in the way of honest and 
fairly conducted takeover transactions”: JENKINS COMMITTEE, 1962 Report, Cmnd 1749, 
paragraph 265. 
provision patterns of ownership change which are inherently different for 
close companies and public listed companies. A clear example is given by 
the most debated “one share one vote” rule: such a mandatory rule, if ever 
appropriate for listed companies38, would certainly be inappropriate for 
closed companies. 
 
 
14.- Based on the above, the distinction between pre bid and post bid 
regimes quickly appeared to be also politically untenable. Understandably 
enough, those Member States who would have to change their legislation 
in order to comply (as it was the case for instance of Germany), with the 
passivity rule set out by the directive proposal and did not offer to their 
national companies an array of pre bid company law defences comparable 
to that of other Member States saw an effective level playing field in the 
domain of the pre bid techniques as a necessary prerequisite for their 
approval of the directive39. All these reasons led to the introduction in the 
final text of the directive not only of Article 9, addressing the post bid 
defence with the passivity rule, but also of Article 11, addressing post bid 
defences with the so called “break through rule”. Such a break through rule 
is in fact an ingenious attempt to create a sufficient level playing field in 
respect of pre bid techniques albeit leaving these mechanisms and 
structures in place unless and until a general takeover bid is made and has 
proved successful. Doing so, in the opinion of the High Level Group which 
recommended its adoption to the Commission, said rule “would strike an 
appropriate balance between, on the one hand, the need, at least for the 
time being, to allow differences in the capital and control structures of 
companies in view of the current differences between Member States and, 
on the other hand, the need to allow and stimulate successful takeover bids 
to take place in order to create an integrated securities market in 
Europe”(40).  
 
                                                 
38 See the Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union, external study 
commissioned by the EU Commission to Shearman & Sterling, ISS and ECGI, Brussels, 
July 2007, passim and the recent decision of Commissioner McCreevy to suspend any 
action in this respect. 
39 J.N.GORDON, An American Perspective on Anti-Takeover Laws, p.  545-547 (where the 
conclusion, at 546, that “what best protects against the potential for economic nationalism 
is the mutual vulnerability to takeover bids by both of the firms in question”)  
40 HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, Report on Issues Related to Takeover 
Bids, Brussels, 10 January 2002, p. 29-30. 
 
15.- The “break through rule” was not unknown in the European 
Union before the High Level Group recommendation. It was put forward 
for the first time in 1992 by the French COB when, according to Article 
177 of the Law of 24 July 1966 (41) BSN Danone amended its articles of 
association to set out a voting cap. In that occasion, COB obtained that the 
articles of association of the company had to also provide that the cap 
would have automatically become ineffective if a bid were successful in 
obtaining shares representing 2/3 of the voting rights (42). A statutory 
provision of the break through rule was then to be found in Italy under 
Article 3 of Law no. 474 of 30 July 1994 on privatisation and was then 
reflected in Article 212 of the Italian Decree no. 58 of 1998. It should be 
noted in this respect that, the former version of the rule published in 1994 
made the break through conditional upon the attainment by the bidder of 
the majority of the voting rights, whereas the latter provision of 1998 
dropped, at least in the wording of the provision, such requirement (43). 
Despite these differences in the details of the French and Italian models, a 
common feature of both national experiences was to be found in that the 
rule addressed only voting caps. It left untouched, instead, all of the 
statutory or by-laws provisions concerning the appointment and removal of 
the board of directors, which in different ways could delay or hinder a swift 
substitution of the board on the part of the successful bidder (e.g. double 
voting in France, special rights to nominate board members, staggered 
board, fixed term appointment, supermajorities, long lasting office tenure 
as a requirement for appointment to the board and alike). Albeit limited in 
scope, this rule facilitated however the success of hostile bids by making 
the acquisition of a (qualified) majority stake sufficient to automatically 
                                                 
41 “Les statuts peuvent limiter le nombre des voix dont chaque actionnaire dispose dans les 
assemblées, sous la condition que cette limitation sera imposée à toutes les actions, sans 
distinction de catégorie, autre que les actions à dividende sans droit de vote”.  
42 “Les limitations prévues ci-dessus deviennent caduques, sans qu’il y ait lieu à une 
nouvelle décision de l’assemblée générale extraordinaire des actionnaires, dès lors qu’une 
personne physique ou morale, seule ou de concert avec une ou plusieurs personnes 
physiques ou morales, vient à détenir au moins les deux tiers du nombre total des actions 
de la société, à la suite d’une procédure publique visant la totalité des actions de la société. 
Le conseil d’administration constate la caducité et procède aux formalités corrélatives de 
modification des statuts”. This clause is reportedly customary.  
43 “La clausola che prevede un limite di possesso decade comunque allorché il limite sia 
superato per effetto di un’offerta pubblica di acquisto promossa ai sensi degli articoli 106 
e 107 del testo unico”. Whether this provision applies also where the bidder does not 
achieve the absolute majority threshold is however still debated. 
empower the bidder to exert control over the company without the need of 
a formal resolution of the shareholders’ meeting to remove the cap (44). A 
similar effect, in respect to shareholders’ agreement carrying transfer or 
voting restrictions, was to be found in Article 123 of the Italian Decree no. 
58 of 1998, consenting to each party of the agreement to terminate it at no 
cost upon the occurrence of a bid (a provision subsequently mimicked, 
albeit in slightly different form, by Spanish law 17 July 2003, no. 26/2003 
and in particular by its “disposicion transitoria tercera”) The High Level 
Group proposal widened, however, the scope of these remedies, 
transforming the same into a general device designed to operate in respect 
to a greater variety of pre bid technical barriers. The implied rationale of 
the break through rule advocated by the High Level Group was that 
shareholders are free to define as they deem fit all sorts of voting 
arrangements and other restrictions on the transferability of control in the 
articles of association (also delivering the control to one or a few 
shareholders regardless of the proportion between risk and control) but, at 
the occurrence of a takeover, confirmation of their initial agreement must 
be sought after. To the extent they tender the vast majority of their shares 
to the bidder, the shareholders reverse their initial agreement on the pre bid 
technical barriers against takeover and the bidder should therefore, upon 
reaching the threshold, be able to break through said provisions in the 
articles of association. It is clear that there is here a significant deviation 
from the general rules of privity of contract and “pacta sunt servanda”: a 
deviation which was advocated by the High Level Group and was then 
accepted by the directive on the implied assumption that there is a major 
public interest in fostering the cross border consolidation of the European 
industry and the contestability of control of listed companies.  
 
 
16.- As anticipated, though, the adopted version of the break through 
rule - which can be read in Article 11 and, as noted above, was broadened 
                                                 
44 Lacking such a rule, the sole alternative for the bidder would be either to make a bid 
contingent upon the removal by the shareholders’ meeting of the cap or to organize a 
concerted action, whereby several bidders acting jointly would severally acquire 
shareholdings which, for each of them, do not exceed the cap but jointly provide the 
majority of votes. In the highly controversial arena of a bid, the latter practice would be 
however very likely to be litigated by referring to the by-laws voting caps the notion of 
concerted action already traditional in most of the national regulation on takeovers. The 
conditional offer would not prevent, moreover, incumbent minority controllers from 
dominating the shareholders’ meeting called to approve a frustrating action. 
in scope in the wake of the parliamentary debate – encompasses only some 
of most common pre-bid technical barriers to takeover (herein included 
multiple vote shares45), refraining from providing a general rule designed 
to “break through” any type of such barriers46. Moreover, it does not affect 
companies’ models other than  public listed companies (such as the 
partnership limited by shares and cooperatives: Article 11-7) nor dictates 
alternative remedies to neutralise additional pre-bid barriers to takeovers 
like pyramids and relevant agreements conditional upon the change of 
control for which the break through rule is not well-suited47 but which 
                                                 
45 For the rationale of such inclusion and for a detailed discussion of the ways to 
compensate the affected shareholders (an equitable compensation now mandated by 
Article 11(5)), B.DAUNER LIEB, M.LAMANDINI, Report to the European Parliament on the 
Commission’s new proposal of a directive on company law concerning takeover bids, at § 
5.1 and 5.2. 
46 See B.DAUNER LIEB, M.LAMANDINI, Report to the European Parliament on the 
Commission’s new proposal of a directive on company law concerning takeover bids, at § 
5.5 (“From the wording of Article 11 it results that the break through rule adopted by the 
Commission is very narrow in scope and covers only a few pre-bid defensive measures. 
We disagree with this. Concurring with the opinion of the High Level Group, we do 
believe indeed that Article 11 should cover any type of arrangements the effect of which is 
the same as the effect of those statutory or contractual arrangements which are expressly 
mentioned in Article 11. A limitation to only a few of such technicalities, setting aside 
other equivalent technicalities, would appear indeed fully inconsistent. One very good 
example was already given by the High Level Group and refers to the situation in which a 
company has issued voting shares to a trust or administration office which in turn has 
issued listed non voting depository receipts in respect of those shares. As suggested by the 
High Level Group, the un-enforcement rule should be tailored here to make the depository 
receipts freely exchangeable into the underlying shares in the event of a general takeover 
bid. Similarly, when the shareholders’ agreement is a voting trust, it should be clear that 
the un-enforcement of the restrictions on voting rights confer the right to vote as they 
deem appropriate in the meeting convened to pass resolutions concerning the adoption of 
post bid techniques directly to the beneficial owners and not to the trustee. It might also be 
advisable to carefully examine whether this rule should also apply to the constituent 
documents at creating  foundations, making unenforceable the obligation sometimes 
herein set out to maintain control at all times. On the other hand, this would also suggest 
to specify that the break through rule shall cover all those statutory or by-laws provisions 
concerning the appointment and removal of the board of directors, which in different ways 
could delay or hinder a swift substitution of the board by the bidder (i.g. staggered board, 
fixed term appointment, supermajorities, long lasting office tenure as requirement for the 
appointment of the board). At the first shareholders’ meeting the successful bidder should 
be able to immediately nominate the new management.) 
47 B.DAUNER LIEB, M.LAMANDINI, Report to the European Parliament on the 
Commission’s new proposal of a directive on company law concerning takeover bids, at § 
5.6 (where the recommendation “to prohibit in the future the listing of any company 
whose main asset is the shareholding in another listed company, according to a practice 
already followed for instance by the Italian listing rules and now also recommended by the 
High Level Group, unless the economic value of such admission is clearly demonstrated” 
would have deserved, however, a similar pro-competitive regulation. The 
most critical (and disturbing) point is however that the adoption of the 
“break through” rule was possible only at the price of waiving the 
mandatory nature of the harmonised provisions of Article 9 and 11. At the 
price of making, thus, the level playing field only optional. Article 12 of 
the directive – ironically adopting in Europe, due to nationalistic political 
constraints, a regulatory choice advocated for U.S. federal securities laws 
by Bebchuk and Ferrel48 - sets out indeed that: 
 
“Member States may reserve the right not to require companies  
which have their registered offices within their territories to apply 
Article 9(2) and (3) and 11”. 
 
It was therefore permitted to Member States to opt out these core 
provisions of the directive when implementing the same. Having waived 
the mandatory nature of such provisions, the European aspiration to foster 
the contestability of control represents no more than a simple benchmark 
recommended to Member States. This is somehow confirmed by the fact 
that, where Member States opt out, they must nevertheless “grant 
companies which have their registered office within their territories the 
option of applying Article 9(2) and (3) and/or Article 11”. This pro-
contestability aspiration is particularly timid, though. Suffice to say that the 
company’s decision to adopt Article 9 and 11 requires an opting in 
resolution to be taken by the shareholders’ meeting with the highest 
majorities required for the amendment to the articles of association  and it 
is made “reversible”. In an attempt to discourage, as much as possible, a 
race to the bottom in the implementation of the directive – and namely the 
                                                                                                                          
and “to introduce, for those pyramids already listed, a duty to list in a specific segment of 
the regulated market as well as an obligation to delist when the existing operating 
company is transformed in a simple pyramid vehicle”) and at § 5.7. (where the 
recommendation that agreements conditional upon the change of control such as golden 
parachutes, loan and credit agreements, call option rights to buy assets of the company 
should be subject to a provisions inspired by Article 556 of the Belgian Company Code, 
according to which the shareholders’ meeting must formally approve any transaction 
whereby the company grants a right to a third party contingent upon the launching of a 
public offer for its shares or upon the change of control of the same”). 
48 L.A.BEBCHUK, A.FERREL, A new Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory 
Competition, 87 Va. L. Rev. 111 (2001) and, in response mainly to J.R.MACEY, Displacing 
Delaware: Can the Feds Do a Better Job Than the States in Regulating Takeovers?, 57 
Bus. Law. 1025 (2002), L.A.BEBCHUK, A. FERREL, On Takeover Law and Regulatory 
Competition, 57 Bus. Law. 1047 (2002) 
adoption by all Member States of opting out provisions in order to avoid 
the risk of national vulnerability to foreign takeover bids in a European 
setting not characterised by the parity of army - Article 12(3) sets forth a 
reciprocity clause, whereby also companies subject to Article 9 and 11 
(either according to the Member State opting in choice or due to the 
shareholders’ meeting resolution) may, “under the conditions determined 
by national law”, be exempted from applying the legal provisions 
displacing pre-bid and post-bid barriers “if they become the subject of an 
offer by a company which does not apply the same Articles or controlled, 
directly or indirectly, by the latter49.  
 
 
17.- As it was certainly likely and expected, the implementation of 
the directive marked a general failure in the attainment of a pan-European 
level playing field for cross-border takeover bids in Europe. Liberalism 
failed. Indeed, as of February 2007, the Commission reported in its “Report 
on the Implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids50”that, in the 
fourteenth Member States were the directive had been implemented by its 
deadline, the passivity rule of Article 9 was implemented in all cases but 
for Denmark, Germany51, Luxembourg. All the opting in States, however, 
had already a similar obligation in place before transposition (except for 
Malta and its 13 listed companies) and, due to the application of the 
reciprocity clause of Article 12 by many of the opting in Member States, 
                                                 
49 On the likely difficulties in the application of such a reciprocity principle M.BECHT, 
Reciprocity in Takeovers, p. 653 (available also at http://ssrn.com/abstract=46003); 
M.GATTI, Optionality Arrangements and Reciprocity in the European Takeover Directive, 
6 Eur. Bus. Org. L. Rev. 553 (2005) 
50 SEC(2007) 268 of 21st February 2007 
51 Germany confirmed indeed the pre-existing regime of § 33 of WpUG. Under § 33a and 
33b of the WpUG, as introduced by the UberRUmsG of 14 July 2006 neutrality and break 
through rule can apply, though, if expressly opted in by the company’s articles of 
association, expressly derogating to the provisions of § 33 and making express reference 
to § 33b. Note however that, as correctly pointed out by J.W.CIOFFI, Restructuring 
“Germany Inc.”: The Politics of Company and Takeover Law Reform in Germany and in 
the European Union, 24 Law & Pol’y 355 (2002), at p. 388 contrary to a quite common 
misconception, “the irony of the battle over the Takeover Directive was that Germany did 
not switch its position on the Takeover Directive because it was hostile to economic 
modernization and liberalization. Rather, it was because domestic reforms had already 
liberalized the legal structure of corporate governance to a significant degree and other 
member states had not undertaken similar steps. The European Commission refused to 
acknowledge or address this issue that was of paramount importance to domestic political 
and economic actors” 
many of them, whilst accepting in principle the pssivity rule subject it now 
to reciprocity (France, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia and no Italy). 
The Commission correctly pointed out, thus, that “these Member States 
have increased the management’s power to take frustrating measures 
without the approval of shareholders”: a situation which “likely holds back 
the emergence of an open takeover market rather than promote it”. As 
regards the “break through rule” of Article 11, the general outlook is even 
bleaker. The Commission finds that “the vast majority of Member States 
have not imposed (or are unlikely to impose) the breakthrough rule, but 
have made it optional for companies52. Break through is expected to be 
imposed only in the Baltic states”. Following the opt out decisions of the 
Member States, very few companies are expected to apply Article 11 on a 
voluntary basis. Finally “the majority of Member States have allowed 
companies to reciprocate against a bidder not subject to Articles 9 and 
1153”.  
 
 
18.- On the question of trans-Atlantic and, more in general, non 
pan-European cross border takeovers, the directive chose not to specifically 
address the issue of an international level playing field and of the treatment 
to be reserved to a non European bidder. The preparatory works focussed, 
in this respect, solely on the trans-Atlantic relations considering that U.S. 
state legislation (as showed above) provides for a wide range of anti 
takeover devices. The High Level Group, however, suggested not to take 
any specific action, reasoning that current patterns of European flows of 
investment towards the United States show “that defensive mechanism and 
state defensive laws have not blocked European companies taking over 
American companies” (54). Only “if political concerns remain”, the Group 
                                                 
52 See, for instance, the Takeovers Directive (Interim Implementation) Regulation 2006, 
effective as of 20 May 2006 (on the assumption that “market pressure in the UK means 
that very few such measures in fact exist”: J.BIRDS, Report from the United Kingdom, in 
ECL, 2006, p. 209) and French law no. 2006-387 of 31 March 2006 (on the perceived 
reinforcement of the already existing isolation of French champions from the market for 
corporate control – ironically also through the use of Dutch Stichting -.brought about by 
the new law, F.CARLE, Are French Listed Companies Takeover Proof?, in ECL, 2007, p. 
154 and the Marini Report to the Senate on “Offres Publiques d’Acquisitions”, no. 268). 
53 See for instance the Italian provision of new Article 104-ter, which applies reciprocity 
also when only one of the concerted parties is not subject to Article 9 and/or 11.  
54 HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, Report on Issues Related to Takeover 
Bids, p. 41. 
recommended to provide that the benefit of the break through rule “can be 
enjoyed by listed European companies making general takeover bids for 
other listed European companies, to the extent that this would not violate 
international agreements and could be practically enforced”: a sort of 
anticipation of the reciprocity clause then set out in Articles 12. Not 
surprisingly, in the silence of the directive, the final outcome of the process 
of national implementation was basically to subject non-European bidders 
to the reciprocity clause, at least in any Member State adopting such a 
reciprocity clause (where this is not the case, national or international 
multilateral and bilateral general rules on foreign investment control the 
matter). How to assess, however, whether a U.S. or Russian or Chinese 
bidder is or is not contestable, remains practically obscure, prompting both 
very significant administrative55 and judicial discretion at the national 
level (and ex-ante uncertainty) and a strong risk of nationalistic capture. 
As we already noted, in fact, the takeover regimes in the United States and 
the European Union are, for instance, hardly comparable and in the U.S. 
anti-takeover measures are generally said to be used by the management to 
get a better price for the shareholders rather than to frustrate the bid and 
insulate the company from the market of corporate control. It could be very 
difficult, therefore, to assess whether the Delaware regime as applied to the 
specific articles of association of the offeror does or does not meet the 
reciprocity requirement. On the other hand, the silence of the directive 
confirms that Member States are free to set out, if deemed suitable in their 
national interest, veto power or other equivalent measures with respect to 
takeovers launched by a bidder whose ultimate controlling entity is 
incorporated outside the European Union, provided however that they 
abide by their international obligations and by the basic freedom of free 
circulation of capital enshrined in the Treaty and in its implementing 
directives and currently considered by the Commission applicable, subject 
to certain limitations, also to third non EU parties. A similar provision is 
for example since long present in the Italian antitrust law (law 10 October 
1990, no. 287), under Article 25 (2): the Prime Minister, upon resolution of 
the Council of Ministers and if essential interests of the national economy 
                                                 
55 See, for instance, the Italian provision of new Article 104-ter, which requires the Italian 
supervisory authority CO.N.SO.B. “to determine with a substantiated decision, upon 
request of the offeror or of the target company and within 60 days from such a request, if 
the provisions applicable to the bidder are equivalent to those applied to the target 
company”. 
are concerned, is empowered indeed to enjoin the acquisition of control of 
an Italian company from a prospective acquirer incorporated in a State 
applying discriminatory provisions for similar acquisitions by Italian 
companies. In France, under Decree 2005-1739 of 30 December 2005 the 
prior authorisation of the French Ministry of Economy is required for 
acquisitions in 11 economic sectors that are considered particularly 
sensitive for French national interests, herein included the preservation of 
industrial capacities on the French territory (R&D, know-how and other IP 
assets, production capacity). If necessary, French authorities may condition 
their authorization to specific commitments from the foreign investors. 
Moreover, under the OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements, 
France reserved the right to restrict foreign investment in air transport, 
maritime transport, insurance and in the national security-related sectors. 
Similar, albeit less extensive, limitations to foreign direct investment in 
strategic industries exist in Germany56, United Kingdom57 and basically in 
all Member States.  
 
 
19.- Despite these exceptional restriction set out by the law in the 
national public interest, ironically, whilst it was being consummated the 
political failure of the European attempt to dismantle private-law pre-bid 
barriers to takeovers, the Commission was successful – partly using its 
powers based upon free circulation of capital and freedom to establish and 
partly using the new and effective weapon enshrined in Article 21(4) of the 
new Merger Regulation no. 139/2004 - in addressing many of the hidden 
administrative barriers lifted by Member States to the cross border market 
for corporate control. This occurred, for instance, with respect to the 
traditionally fortified “national bastions” in the historically strategic 
banking, highway and energy sectors. In the banking field58, the perceived 
                                                 
56 § 2 (6) and (7) of the German Foreign Trade Law gives the government the power to 
restrict foreign direct investment for reasons of national security, public order, foregn 
policy and balance of trade considerations. 
57 Industry Act of 1975 authorises the government to enjoin the takeover of an “important” 
manufacturing concern by non resident if against the national interest: the provision has 
never been used, though. 
58 See Cross border consolidation in the EU financial sector, Commission staff working 
document, SEC(2005) 1398, Brussels, 26 October 2005, acknowledging at p. 23 that 
“anecdotal evidence seems to show that the financial sector is often considered as a 
strategic one and therefore interference with business decisions is more likely”. See also 
COMP/M.1616 in the case BSCH/Champalimaud. This protectionist attitude in the field is 
opportunistic use of denials or delays in the prudential authorisation for 
bank acquisitions by the former Governor of the Bank of Italy (lately in the 
Antonveneta and BNL cases, where, ironically, the criminal proceedings 
based on the harmonized market abuse regime brought about an Eliot 
Spitzer effect “the Italian way”, sweeping away “backroom” defences and 
ultimately favoring cross border takeovers ) prompted the adoption of the 
recently approved Directive amending directives 92/49/EC, 2002/83/EC 
2004/39/EC 2005/68/EC and 2006/48/EC 59. In the highway sector, the  
failed cross border merger between Autostrade and Abertis, abandoned by 
the parties in 2006 due to the refusal of Italian authorities to transfer 
highway concessions, prompted a double reaction of the Commission (both 
based on free circulation of capital and article 21 of the merger regulation) 
which led to the adoption of a new Italian ministerial “directive” 
preventing any opportunistic use of administrative discretion for national 
protectionism. Similar was the outcome in the energy sector in the wake of 
the three “Endesa” cases60, with the final adoption of a new directive in the 
field.  
 
 
20.- The same can be said in respect of “golden shares”. Indeed, 
although the takeover directive is explicitly excluding from the “break 
through rule” “golden shares”, on the assumption that they must be 
considered by the Commission on a case by case basis, the European Court 
of Justice, beginning with its path-breaking judgments of 23 January 2000, 
in the case C-58/98, Commission v. Republic of Italy, and, two years later, 
4 June 2002 in the cases C-367/98  Commission v. Portugal, C-483/99 
Commission v. France and C-503/99 Commission v. Belgium, inaugurated 
                                                                                                                          
very old: a former Italian Prime Minister, Francesco Nitti, could write in Il capitale 
straniero in Italia, Bari, Giuseppe La Terza, 1915, at p. 57 “è doveroso ammettere che le 
banche le quali accettano depositi e perciò stesso dispongono del risparmio nazionale non 
possano essere amministrate da cittadini straneri. So che questa disposizione alcuni 
ritengono inefficace, altri dannoso: ma niuno in buona fede può negarne l’utilità. Tutte le 
riforme legislative non sono in sé stesse buone o cattive; ma vanno sempre riferite a 
momenti storici e a condizioni attuali. Se in passato ogni limitazione all’opera e al capitale 
degli stranieri riusciva dannosa, le condizioni sono del tutto mutate. Del resto lo Stato non 
può lasciare senza difesa alcuna il risparmio popolare”. 
59 See also the Communication from the Commission on “Intra-EU investment in the 
financial services’ sector”, 21 October 2005.  
60 See cases COMP/M.4110, COMP/M.4197 and COMP/M.4672 
a substantial flow of cases (some of which still pending)61 dismantling such 
restriction based on Article 56 of the Treaty, unless it could be showed 
that: i) they are justified by one of the reasons listed in Article 58 or by 
compelling reasons of general interest within the meaning of the “Cassis de 
Dijon” case law; ii) are suitable for the achievement of the intended 
purpose, iii) necessary and proportionate. The catalogue of “golden shares” 
found inconsistent with the Treaty is quite long and there is an apparent 
tendency towards the broadening of the scope of Article 56 of the Treaty. 
In the words of Advocate General Poiares Maduro of 7 September 2006 in 
the joint-cases C463/04 and C-464/04 (discussing a situation where “as a 
result of the combined effect of the right of direct appointment of up to a 
quarter of the members of the board of directors set out in the articles of 
association based on a special provision reserved to State or other public 
entities and the right to participate in the election of directors by voting on 
the basis of lists, the Comune di Milano can control an absolute majority of 
appointments to the board of directors, despite its minority shareholding”) 
“18.(There are) three underlying issues. The first is whether it is of 
importance that the powers of appointment at issue are, at least in 
part, based on a provision of private law. The second is whether 
Article 56 EC applies ratione personae to public bodies when they 
are not exercising their public authority. The third issue involves the 
question which rights, when held by a public body in the role of 
shareholder in a company, are ‘liable to dissuade investors in other 
Member States from investing in the capital of [that company]’. I 
shall discuss each issue in turn. 19. In my opinion, the fact that the 
powers of appointment of the Comune di Milano are based on a 
provision of private law does not preclude the application of Article 
56 EC. In that regard, it is worth noting that, for the purpose of 
determining whether the free movement of capital is restricted where 
the State enjoys special powers in an undertaking, it is immaterial 
how those powers are granted or what legal form they take. The fact 
that a Member State acts within the framework of its domestic 
company law does not mean that its special powers cannot constitute 
a restriction within the meaning of Article 56 EC. Otherwise, 
Member States would easily be able to avoid the application of 
Article 56 EC, by using their position as incumbent shareholders to 
achieve within the framework of their civil laws what they would 
otherwise have achieved by using their regulatory powers. 20. The 
                                                 
61 ECJ, 13 May 2003, case C463/00, Commission v. Spain; ECJ, 13 May 2003, case 
C98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom; ECJ 2 June 2005, case C174/04, Commission v. 
Republic of Italy; ECJ, 28 September 2006, joint cases C282/04 and 283/04, Commission 
v. The Netherlands, Opinion AG Poiares Maduro, 7 September 2006, in the joint cases 
C463/04 and 464/04, Federconsumatori v. AEM; opinion AG Ruiz Jarabo 13 February 
2007 in the case C112/05, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany. 
present case exemplifies this. The file shows that the Comune di 
Milano initially proposed that the articles of association should give 
it a special power to appoint one quarter of the members of the board 
of directors directly, pursuant to Article 2(d) of Law No 474/1994. 
Originally, that provision offered a legal basis for conferring on 
public bodies the special power to appoint a minimum of one or more 
directors. Article 2 of Law No 474/1994, in its original version, was 
discussed in Case C-58/99 Commission v Italy. The Court ruled that, 
by adopting that provision, Italy had contravened Article 56 EC. 
Subsequently, the law was amended, in particular as regards the 
special powers provided for by Article 2. Nevertheless, in its 
Decision 5/04 of 8 March 2004 the Comune di Milano introduced 
what is, in effect, the same power of appointment, albeit on the basis 
of Article 2449 of the Italian Civil Code. Irrespective of what the 
motives of the Comune di Milano may have been for altering its 
choice of legal basis, it is clear that it would not be difficult for 
Member States to avoid the restrictions imposed by Article 56 EC if 
that provision were deemed not to apply to situations governed by 
private law. 21. The second issue is whether Article 56 EC applies 
ratione personae to a public body, where its actions, regardless of 
their legal form, are private in nature and thus are not carried out in 
the exercise of the public authority of the State. To put the issue more 
generally: are Member States under a duty to respect the Treaty 
provisions on the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital when they are not exercising their public authority? 22. In my 
opinion, they are. Member States are subject to the rules on free 
movement, which clearly apply to them, not in their capacity as 
public authority but in their capacity as signatories to the Treaty. As 
a result, the provisions on free movement impose obligations on the 
national authorities of the Member States, irrespective of whether 
those authorities act in their capacity as a public authority or as a 
private entity. Indeed, any entity through which the State acts comes 
within the scope ratione personae of the provisions on free 
movement. In principle, therefore, a public body such as the Comune 
di Milano cannot rely on the argument that its actions are essentially 
private in nature to avoid the application of the Treaty provisions on 
free movement. 23. None the less, the question whether a public 
body is in the same position and acts in the same way as a private 
shareholder is of relevance for the delineation of the scope ratione 
materiae of Article 56 EC. It is a factor in determining which rights, 
when held by a public body in the role of shareholder in a company, 
are liable to dissuade investments from other Member States. 24. As 
with the other freedoms, the purpose of the principle of the free 
movement of capital is to promote the opening up of national 
markets through the opportunity afforded to investors and 
undertakings seeking capital to benefit fully from the Community’s 
internal market. In order to achieve that objective, Member States are 
required to take into account the effects of their actions as regards 
investors established in other Member States who wish to exercise 
their right to the free movement of capital. In that context, Article 56 
EC prohibits not only discrimination on grounds of nationality, but 
also discrimination which, in respect of the exercise of a 
transnational activity, imposes additional costs or hinders access to 
the national market for investors established in other Member States 
either because it has the effect of protecting the position of certain 
economic operators already established in the market or because it 
makes intra-Community trade more difficult than internal trade. Any 
national measure that results in treating transnational situations less 
favourably than purely national situations constitutes a restriction on 
free movement. Subject to that reservation, Member States remain 
free to regulate economic activity in their territories and to participate 
in the national market. 25. The mere fact that a public body owns 
shares in a company does not reduce the attractiveness of 
cross-border investments in that company, as long as investors in 
other Member States can be sure that the public body concerned will, 
with a view to maximising its return on investment, respect the 
normal rules of operation of the market. However, as public bodies 
are subject to local or national mechanisms of political 
accountability, they are naturally inclined to adjust their conduct in 
light of the interests of those who are represented within the 
framework of those mechanisms. Therefore, when a public body 
holds shares which give it a privileged position in relation to other 
shareholders as regards its powers of control in the company 
concerned, there is a real risk that those powers will be used to grant 
selective and potentially discriminatory access to the national market. 
This explains, in my view, the case-law concerning golden shares 
and the limits imposed on the State when it acts as a participant in the 
market. 26. In my opinion, this case-law imposes a requirement of 
consistency upon Member States. The Treaty entitles the Member 
States to maintain public ownership of certain companies. However, 
once a Member State decides to open up a particular sector of the 
market, it must act in a manner which is consistent with that decision 
and fully respect the principles of openness and non-discrimination 
enshrined in the rules governing the Community’s internal market. In 
other words, States are not entitled selectively to curtail the access of 
market operators to that sector of the market. In the case of the 
privatisation of former State-owned companies, this requirement is 
particularly important. If the State were entitled to maintain special 
forms of market control over privatised companies, it could easily 
frustrate the application of the rules on free movement by granting 
only selective and potentially discriminatory access to substantial 
parts of the national market. Such forms of control are accordingly 
liable to dissuade investments from other Member States. 27. When 
the State privatises a company, therefore, the rules on the free 
movement of capital require that the company’s economic 
independence be protected, unless there is a need to safeguard 
fundamental public interests recognised by Community law. In this 
way, any State control, outside the normal market mechanisms, of a 
privatised company must be linked to carrying out the activities of 
general economic interest associated with that company 
 
Despite the breath of these conclusions, it seems however that, still, the 
scope of application of the European case law on golden shares cannot be 
extended to private-law anti-takeover measures so long as they are not 
enjoyed by the State or other public entities. Indeed, such pre bid anti 
takeover measures, as long as put into place by private parties, are not 
properly based on legal provisions adopted by Member States, but are 
adopted, under a freedom of contract paradigm, by the articles of 
association of the company concerned or through shareholders’ agreement. 
They are therefore attributable to the State only in an extremely indirect 
manner. The role of the State in the creation of such obstacles is limited to 
refraining from prohibiting the creation of such takeover obstacles by 
freely concluded contracts and in principle restrictive effects arising from 
the absence of national provisions seem to be irrelevant. It seems therefore 
difficult, according to the current interpretation of Article 56 of the Treaty, 
to derive from the freedom of movement of capital an obligation of the 
State to prevent takeover obstacles created by private parties, even if this 
contradicts a general level playing field between private and public 
obstacles to the contestability of control. But the point is that, whilst it is 
generally recognised that protective duties can follow for the Member 
States from the basic freedoms of the Treaty, and that Member States can 
also be obliged under certain conditions to enforce these freedoms against 
any third party interference, it will always be necessary in such cases to 
reasonably balance the freedom of the individual and the intended 
restriction of the basic freedoms. The Member State shall therefore act to 
enforce the basic freedoms only in cases of especially serious violations by 
a private party and certainly is not obliged to do so in where a European 
directive itself, through the opting out rule in Article 12, does not out-law 
such private arrangements.  
 
 
 21.- It remains to be questioned, in the light of the above, if the 
nationality of the owners does really matter in protecting the interests of 
the national economy, as the protectionist attitudes indicated above (and 
often voiced in the political debate) would suggest. To the best of my 
knowledge, there are no studies, so far, quantitatively measuring the impact 
of the nationality of the (final) owners on the company’s performance and 
its alignment with the national interests of the maximization of domestic 
wealth, production and labour creation. The impression is, however, that 
national (final) ownership essentially meets the needs of the national 
politics (and, due to the close interplay between politics and economy in 
the modern society, of national oligarchies controlling both fields) to exert 
some kind of control, albeit in an opaque and indirect way, on strategic 
industries (following a “twist the arms” approach in respect to nationals 
controlling such industries which, clearly enough, cannot be extended to 
foreigners). There is no particular reason to believe, however, that such an 
informal and not transparent influence actually serve the needs of the 
national community as a whole more than the private needs of the 
(national) “oligarchs”. Not surprisingly, most of those controlling listed 
companies do so through foreign holding companies which benefit from 
the existing fiscal regulatory competition and, by doing so, do transfer part 
of the national wealth abroad, despite their citizenship. Increased pan 
European corporate mobility, in turn, makes company’s nationality a 
reversible choice for shareholders and renders the current nationality of the 
company by nature subject to change, irrespective of the nationality of the 
controlling shareholders. It is certainly true, on the other hand, that the 
existing uneven structural economic development at the international and 
European level, coupled also with uneven ownership structures, makes the 
market for corporate control strongly unilateral: this is a pattern clearly 
showed, in recent times, by the large outflow of foreign direct investments 
from original Member States to new entrants in the European Union, for 
instance in the banking and financial industries. This trend could thus pre-
empt the growth of national champions in weaker economies. National 
champions are not a good in itself, though. There is often the case, indeed, 
of foreign companies finely serving the needs of a national market more 
efficiently than national champions, with far less subsidisation. In turn, 
antitrust laws, from their side, should help in preventing that a unilateral 
process of industrial consolidation prompted by the flow of foreign 
investment may lead to a monopolistic or oligopolistic market dominance 
in the relevant Member State. The question seems to be, therefore, if an 
ownership requirement (based on nationality) cannot be more efficiently 
replaced by performance requirements or other conduct of business 
conditions set by the relevant Member State aimed at realizing straight and 
transparently the national interests implied in the basically exceptional 
cases of strategic industries, where market forces cannot be left to operate 
alone. This is in fact a tendency in action62, which has also remarkable 
                                                 
62 See for instance the shift from the ownership control to performance controls in the field 
of highways and energy in the wake of recent contested European takeover mentioned 
above. 
precedents for instance, in the financial sector, in the U.S. Community 
Reinvestment Act enacted in the late seventies when interstate banking 
consolidation started to modify the structure of the U.S. banking industry. 
Such an Act required indeed banks to invest part of the deposit within the 
same community. It is unfortunate, thus, that international and community 
law provisions (partially) seem to hamper a wide recourse to such 
performance requirements. In fact, such national provisions must be 
assessed against the international obligations of the host country embedded 
in the GATS and TRIMs 63 (which restrict performance requirements such 
as technology transfer rules, manufacturing limitations, domestic sales, 
local content and manufacturing requirements) and, in the European Union, 
in the light of Article 49 (freedom to provide services)64, Article 43 
(freedom to establish)65 and Article 56 (free circulation of capital)66, which 
are currently interpreted by the ECJ as not to allow Member States to be 
too intrusive, through national regulation, into the way the enterprise is 
conducted and operated in the host country (once a takeover has been 
successfully performed). A different approach – insisting on ownership 
control rather than simple performance – seems to be justified, instead, in 
respect to foreign state-funded acquirers (as it is today the case of 
sovereign wealth funds). The market for corporate control makes sense 
indeed where market participants play the game on an equal footing, 
without benefiting from distorting public subsidization and are motivated 
by genuine economic goals. Where foreign politics leverages economic 
public resources to acquire relevant stakes in the national industries of 
other states, things are different: at a minimum this could paradoxically 
force (as it was feared in Italy in the wake of the EDF attempt to acquire 
Edison) a privatised and liberalized industry to get re-captured in a public 
and monopolistic setting, worst than the original, though, depending on the 
                                                 
63 P.T.MUCHLINSKI, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, Blackwell, Oxford, 1999, p. 
257 
64 ECJ, 3 October 2006, in case C-452/04, Fidium Finanz, especially a § 46 (“it is settled 
case law that all measures which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of 
the freedom to provide services must be regarded as restrictions of that freedom. If the 
requirement of authorisation constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services, 
the requirement of a permanent establishment is the very negation of that freedom. For 
such a requirement to be accepted, it must be shown that it constitutes a condition which is 
indispensable for attaining the objective pursued”)  
65 ECJ, 5 October 2006, case C-442/02, Caixa Bank France (on which see also the opinion 
of AG Tizzano of 25 March 2004). 
66 ECJ, 9 July 1997, C-222/95, Parodi; ECJ, 10 May 1995, C-384/93, Alpine Invest; more 
recently pending case C-270/06, Commission v. Austria 
politics of another state. In a more pessimistic perspective, if and when 
quantitatively and qualitatively relevant, this rising phenomenon, if not 
timely tamed through ownership control rules, could lead to a new form of 
dangerous confrontation among States unpredictable in its final effects.  
